Abstract--This paper provides a simple probability analysis of the usefulness of decision aids that generate fallible advice . The main results are as fol lows.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the development of computer-based systems that provide analytical support to human decision making.
The idea of using com puters to provide decision making advice seems to have emerged somewhat independently from research in three separate areas:
information systems and optimization theory, from which the concept of a decision sup po rt system (DSS) seems to have emerged (e.g. , Sprague and 216 Carlson,
1982)
; psychological and mathematical research in judgment and decision (JDM) from which the idea of a de ci sion aid emerged (e .g. , Adel man, et.al, 1982) ; and artifi cial intelligence, which spawned the popular notion of an expert system (e.g., Hayes Roth, et. al., 1983) .
Common to these aiding tradi tions is the use of analytic techniques that the user is not otherwise likely to employ or have available to recommend possible solutions to a deci sion problem.
This appears to reflect a common underlying as sumption that in contrast to computer systems that only provide problem-relevant info r mation, a computer system that also provides good decision making advi ce, based on its own analysis, is more useful. In other words, there is add ed value in performing a separate analysis and on that basis recommending solutions .
In this paper we critically ex amine this added-value assump tion.
Using a simple probabil ity analysis, we demonstrate that it is unwarranted as an assumption.
Unless special measures are taken, it may be more reasonable to assume the opposite:
that there is little value added by automatically generating advice.
Conditions under which this result can be reversed are then presented.
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the term "decision aid" to refer all three types of aiding systems.
0 FALLIBLE VS. INFALLIBLE ADVICE
Modern technology has provided humankind with many computer driven devices that perform so consistently that they are con sidered virtually infallible. That is, unless something quite unusual occurs, the device is simply trusted to perform its function.
In some cases, this even applies to systems that automate decision making func tions.
For instance, as long as conditions are right (e.g., good weather) , a good pilot will feel comfortable in relin quishing control to an automatic pilot.
By contrast, decision aids that recommend problem solutions are generally quite fallible. Indeed, an infallible advisory system is almost a contradic tion in terms.
Unfortunately, there appear to be some inherent costs as sociated with fallibility.
To illustrate these costs, con sider the following scenario. A decision maker is given a decision aid that is based on an algorithm with an accuracy rate of 70%; that is, 70% of its recommended decisions are, by some accepted criteria, cor rect.
The decision maker when unaided has an accuracy rate of 217 60%.
Should the decision maker attend to the aids advice?
The answer, of course, depends on how that decision maker chooses to use the aid.
Let us assume further that sinc e the aid is known to be fallible, the deci sion maker wishes to use some discretion in heeding the aid's advice.
The user first con siders the aid's advice and after some deliberation, will accept or reject the advice. We assume that the user accepts the aid's advice half the time. Finally if the user rejects the aid's advice, then he or she must solve the problem in the time remaining; with a reduced accuracy rate of, say, 40%.
Should our decision maker at tend to the aid s' advice? Clearly not! As shown in Figure 1 , the probability of generating the correct answer drops to .55, even though the aid is based on an algorithm that performs significantly better than the unaided user! More generally, using eq. 1 in Figure 1 , one could charac terize the comparison between unaided and aided performance as shown in Figure 2 .
As noted there, performance increases linearly with the probability of accepting an aid's advice. The usefulness of the advisory component will vary with changes in individual parameter values, but is in general maxi mal when the aid's advice is accepted rou tinely.
In short, we get a paradoxical result: using a decision aid as an aid appears to be counterproduc tive.
Since this result may be coun terintuitive, let us reconsider the plausibility of this scenario and examine possible P(correct l aided) = P(advice correct l accept advice)*P(accept aid advice) + P(user correct l reject aid advice)*P(reject aid advice) = . 7 *. 5 + .4*.5 = .55, [P(a j b) is the conditional probability of a given b.] objections to eq 1.
First it may seem implausible that the decision maker would excercise much discretion in accepting an aid's advice when the aid has a better hit rate.
It seems un likely, however, that a deci sion maker would simply trans fer decision making respon sibility to a fallible algo rithm even if the user were aware of the algorithm's supe rior hit rate (Dawes, 1979).
Second, one might object that the process of considering and rejecting an aid's advice does not simply "use up" some of the user's problem-solving time. Other compensating benefits are provided.
For example, examin ing an expert system rule trace might give a user partial analysis that will facilitate later problem solving even if the advice is rejected. We suggest, however, that although some decision aids may offer such incidental benefits, there is no reason to ass ume that most decision aids will.
Also, even if there are such problem solving benefits, these benefits are not necessarily attributable to the advisory component of the aid. Partial analyses and problem relevant information can always be presented without also recom mending solutions.
One could argue that the user would be just as well off if he or she used the aid as an information 218 source, but routinely ignored the aid's advice .
(Actually the issue is bit deeper than this.
Partial analyses can also be viewed as advice, lead ing to a recursive arguement. If certain classes of partial analyses are viewed as infal lible (i.e. , always trusted) then, of course, the user should simply accept the par tial analysis results. Partial analyses that are viewed as fallible are subject to the same quantitative analysis presented here.) Third, one might object to the assumption, implicit in eq. 1, that the user is unable to dis criminate correct and incorrect advice.
Thus, the probability of accepting the aid's advice is independent of whether or not the aid generated good ad vice.
At first, this assump tion might seem unreasonable: surely the user is more likely to accept good rather than bad advice.
We suggest, however, that unless one has strong reasons to believe otherwise, this is what should be assumed. To suggest otherwise is to claim that the less accurate problem solver, prior to any independent problem solving, is able to outperform the more ac curate problem solver.
(This issue is investigated further in Section 3.0. ) Finally, it should be noted
Probability Accept Aid's Advice This could be generalized to domains where there are, by some criteria, "better" and "worse" solutions. The analyses in this paper would then remain substantially unchanged, whether or not the criteria for discriminating good from bad solutions is ex plicitly known.
In summary, this analysis sug gest two results.
First, that a decision aid may be most beneficial if it is used as an automated decision maker, rather than as an aid.
Second, if the user wishes to be care ful about when to accept the aid's advice, then aided per formance may actually be worse than unaided performance. Un fortunately, these results seem to contradict the spirit of decision aiding --to build a useful interactive advisory system around a good, but fal lible, algorithm.
OVERCOMING THE COST OF FALLIBILITY
Common sense suggests that "two 219 heads are better than one." Despite the analysis of the previous section, intuition suggests that this maxim should applicable to combined decision maker/decision aid problem solving.
Furthermore, it is clear that the pote ntial per formance of a decision maker/decision aid combination is higher than either problem s olver independently.
In the example of the last section, for instance, if the aid and unaided user are conditionally independent in their hit rates, then the potential combined hit rate is .88 --the probability that at least one of the two problem solvers will generate the correct answer.
Of con cern, therefore, is the deter mination of the conditions un der which this potential can be realized.
Of course, improvements that change any of the various parameter values in eq. 1 will help.
But such changes will not change the result that per formance is maximal when the aid is used as an automated decision maker.
Furthermore, improvements in the incidental benefits obtained from the process of evaluating, but rejecting, the aid's advice will decrease the added-value uniquely attributable to the advisory component.
We suggest instead that a cir cumstance where the user /decision aid combination per forms better than eithe r problem solver independently is only realizable if the decision maker is discriminating about when to accept the aid's ad vice.
To illustrate why, con sider the modification of eq. 1 shown in Figure 3 .
In the ex ample in Section 2. 0, we as sumed that; P(accept advice / advice correct) = .5 P(accept advice ! advice wrong) We now get P(correct l aided) = .68.
Another variant is the case where the user is a good pre dictor of his or he r own capabilities, but does not have a good assessment of the aid's. This suggests a scenario where the user must first problem whether to solve the problem unaided.
If yes, then ignore the aid.
If not, then accept the aid's advice.
This variant leads to the equation shown in Figure 4 .
Assume that the user can pre dict his or her own success 70% of the time, the probability that the aid is correct is in dependent of whether or not the user would be correct, and (for simplicity) that it takes no time to decide whether to use the aid.
We can then plug in the following values: P(correct l aided) = .7*.6 + . 7* . 3 * . 6 + .7*.7*.4 = .742.
Finally,
users who are dis criminating in both ways would P(correct l aided) = P(accept advice l advice correct)*P(advice correct) + P(user correct l reject advice & advice correct) *P(reject advice l advice correct) *P(advice correct)
+ P(user correct J reject advice & advice wrong) *P(reject advice l advice wrong)*P(advice wrong). likely perform even better.
As these quantitative examples suggest, significant benefits can be obtained by supporting a user's ability to be dis criminating in his or her use of an aid.
This suggests that a user must know enough about an aid's falliblities (or her own) to be able to identify circumstances when the aid's advice (or her own judgment) should simply be ignored. Un fortunately, and not supris ingly, few decision aids are designed with the intent of helping a user easily identify contexts in which the aid is likely to be inco rrect.
Similarly, developers intent on transfering an aid to an opera tional environment are not li k ely to advertis e th e weaknesses of their product. Consequently, there is little reason to presume that the ad visory component of many deci sion aids contribute much in the way of decision suppor t (vs. automation).
Fortunately, however, there seem to be a variety of rela tively simple ways to achieve this discrimination. The first, and most obvious, is simply to promote an accurate mental model of the decision aid in the decision maker.
In Lehner and Zirk (1987) , for in stance, it was found that even 221 a rudimentary understanding of how an expert system works could lead to dramatic improve ment in performance. Alterna tively, one could embed within the decision aid itself some "metarules" for identifying contexts in which the aids ad vice should probably be ig nored.
For instance, an aid based on a quantitative uncer tainty calculus might be able to flag situations where there is significant higher order un certainty (significant amount of missing data, sensitivity analysis indicates recommenda tion not robust, etc.). Finally, one could promote, in decision makers, a better un derstanding of the human deci sion making process; perhaps making them aware of many of the common bi ases (e.g., hindsight bias) that lead deci sion makers to be overconfident in their assessment accuracy.
Before closing this section, it is worth noting that in eqs. 1 3 we assumed that after rejecting the aid's advice the probability of generating the correct answer unaided is the same whether or not the rejected advice was correct. Presumably, however, the deci sion maker and the aid's algo rithm are based on a common source of knowledge. One might P(correct l aided) = P(ignore aid l user correct)*P(user correct) + P(advice correct l uses aid)*P{uses aid l user correct) *P(user correct) + P(advice correct l uses aid)*P(uses aid l user wrong) *P(user wrong)
FIGURE 4
Accuracy of Decision Maker/Decision Aid Combination: Equation [3] ("user correct" could be expanded to "user would be correct" .)
therefore expect a positive correlation between the two problem solvers. If, however, the two problem-solving ap proaches are positively corre lated (e.g. , when an expert system is designed to mimic human problem solving), then the aided probability of suc cess can easily decrease.
To illustrate this, recall the ex ample at the beginning of Sec tion 3.0 where we had P(accept advice ! advice correct)
.7 P(accept advice ! advice incorrect) = .3.
which resulted in P {correct I aided) = .6 8.
Now suppose we added the as sumption that the aid's algo rithm is uniformly better than the unaided user. For all problems where the unaided user would generate the correct answer, the algorithm would also get it right.
We then add to our scenario:
Plugging these new numbers into eq. 2 gives us P(correct l aided) = .
67.
The effect of the dependency 222 was small, but negative. More generally, P(correct l aided) decreases whenever the user is more likely to generate a cor rect answer in the same cir cumstances as the aid. For the classes of problems we explored the effect of dependencies of this type was usually small. The impact of such dependencies was therefore ignored in our analysis. However, this result does suggest that the popular notion that decision aids should be designed to mimic human expert problem solving may be misguided.
DISCUSSION
To summarize.
The usefulness of a decision aid depends on thea user's ability to identify contexts in which the aid (or user unaided) is likely to be incorrect.
Without this ability, "considering" the ad vice of a decision aid is coun terproductive --the decision maker would be better off either routinely accepting or ignoring the aid's advice. The same result holds for any par tial analyses.
We do not claim that the simple probability analysis presented here is a realistic model of all the subtleties of a user; decision aid interaction. We do, however, claim that it provides a reasonable characterization of the impact of the variables we are examining.
It is hard to imagine how a more complex model would would sug gest directional impacts dif ferent from those presented in this paper.
Also
of interest is the relationship of this analysis to empirical research examining the effectiveness of decision aids (see for reviews Adelman, in press; Sharda, et.al., 1988) . · Empirical tests have had mixed results --some aids improve performance, others have little effect, and some decrease performance. Unfor tunately, most empirical ef forts to evaluate a decision aid evaluate the aid as a whole.
They do not attempt to discriminate the contribution of various components of an aid.
In this paper we have ex amined the impact of various components analytically. our analysis does not suggest that decision aids per se are inef fective, but only that it is inappropriate to attribute ef fectiveness to advisory support provided by the aid.
While a particular decision aid may be useful, that usefulness could be attributed to the fact that the aid also serves as an in formation system, and may also generate advice that is routinely accepted.
It should not be assumed that the ad visory component, which is the core of most decision aids, provides any useful decision support.
Empirical research in this area is needed.
